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A BALANCING APPROACH TO THE DISCOVERABILITY
OF ACCOUNTANTS' TAX LIABILITY
WORKPAPERS UNDER SECTION 7602
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code,1 the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue has broad authority to summons material
relevant to an investigation of income tax liability.2 The Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) and taxpayers have frequently litigated the scope of
this statutory requirement of relevance, but the courts do not agree on
its parameters.3 Although the IRS has an established right of access to
factual records of underlying transactions,4 it has no such established
1. I.R.C. § 7602 is as follows:
SEC. 7602. EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND WITNESSES.
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax
or the liability at law or equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of
any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;,
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer
or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books
of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for the tax or
required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to
appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to produce
such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry;, and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry.
2. The summons power is a concomitant to the investigative power granted in I.R.C.
§ 7601(a). That section provides that:
The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of
the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue
district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay
any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of
any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed.
3. Compare United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973), and United States v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aft'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977) with
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), and United
States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
4. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Colo. 1975), a'd, 550
F,2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). General ledger trial balances, bank account reconciliations, accounts
receivable, physical inventory listings, and tax returns are factual records. Note, Government Ac-
cess to Corporate Documents and Auditor's Workpaers: Shall We Include Auditors Among the
Priileged Few?, 2 J. Coap. LAw 349, 356 (1977).
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right to nonfactual material.5
A controversy has emerged recently over whether this summons au-
thority extends to an accountant's contingent tax liability workpapers.6
These workpapers contain the independent auditor's analysis of the
likelihood of an additional corporate tax assessment resulting from an
IRS investigation.7 The workpapers thus identify specific transactions
that are vulnerable to various potential tax treatments.' In 1977 the
Tenth Circuit denied the IRS access to such material.9 Since then,
three district courts have granted access."0
Part I of this Note presents the problem and explores the interests
involved."1  Part II discusses the statutory requirement of relevance,
12
the case law interpreting it,'3 and the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege and the attorney's work product rule.1 4 Part III describes the
litigation over access to the workpapers.15 Part IV discusses the elu-
siveness of the relevancy requirement as applied by the courts.' 6 The
policies underlying the attorney-client privilege, the work product rule,
and the taxation system itself are also analyzed. 17 This Note concludes
by proposing that the relevancy requirement calls for a balancing pro-
cess with presumptions of discoverability based on the categories of
documents sought.18 The attorney-client privilege and the work prod-
5. See, eg., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973) (IRS may not summons
proposed budgets); United States v. First Chicago Corp., [1979-1] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 86,034
(N.D. IML 1978) (IRS may summons internal audit reports). Seealso Note, supra note 4, at 356-58.
6. See Caplin, IRS Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, Legal Times Wash.,
July 28, 1980, at 38, col. 1; Caplin, Should the Service be Fermitted to Reach Accountants' Tax
Accrual Workpapers?, 51 J. TAX. 194 (1979); Note, supra note 4.
7. See Caplin, IRSMaintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6, at 38, col.
1.
8. Id. at 38, cols. 1-3.
9. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d
615 (10th Cir. 1917).
10. United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. II 1981); United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., [1980-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119655 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1021 (1980).
11. See notes 20-48 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 49-75 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 76-108 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 109-21 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 122-53 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 154-82 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 183-205 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 210-13 infra and accompanying text.
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uct rule are proposed as useful analogies for balancing the policy
issues. 19
I. THE PROBLEM
Financial statements are the primary means for shareholders and the
public to gain access to corporate information.20 Because the corpora-
tion prepares these statements, an independent audit is necessary to
verify their accuracy." The corporation consequently engages an ac-
counting firm to audit the books of the corporation.22 The auditors
employ generally accepted professional standards and techniques to
test the accuracy of the financial statements and the underlying transac-
tions records.23 They then issue an opinion as to whether the state-
ments are a fair representation of the financial position of the
corporation and an accurate reflection of the results of operations over
the reporting period.24
The areas investigated by the auditors include contingent liabilities.
25
Contingent liabilities are potential liabilities for the corporation that
are dependent upon the occurrence of some future event.26 Accurate
reporting of a client's financial position requires ascertaining the exist-
ence of an adequate reserve or accrual to cover such liabilities27 and, if
19. See notes 206-09 infra and accompanying text.
20. E. SPILLER, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: BASIC CONCEPTS 25-27 (3d ed. 1977); Note, supra
note 4, at 352.
21. W. MEIGS, E. LARSEN & R. MEIGS, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 23 (6th ed. 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING]. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[AICPA] requires that "[i]n all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental
attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors." AICPA, CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS
ON AUDITING STANDARDS § 220.01 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AICPA AUDIT STANDARDS].
22. PRINCIPLES OF AUDrING, supra note 21, at 1-33; E. SPILLER, supra note 20, at 27.
23. AICPA AUDIT STANDARDS, supra note 21, §§ 320, 330. See PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING,
supra note 21, at 163-65.
24. AICPA AUDIT STANDARDS, supra note 21, § 509.28. Depending on the result of the au-
dit, the auditor may also issue a qualified opinion, i. § 509.29, an adverse opinion, id. § 509.41, or
a disclaimer of opinion, id. § 509.45. For a further discussion, see PRINCIPLES OF AUDrNG,
supra note 21, at 686-98.
25. E. SPILLER, supra note 20, at 4041.
26. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT ON ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIEs §§ 1, 33-39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FASB
No. 5]. See E. SPILLER, supra note 20, at 40-41. The author gives as examples disputes over past
taxes, debt guarantees, and pending lawsuits.
27. FASB No. 5, supra note 26, § 8. The standard requires that the loss be probable and be
capable of reasonable estimation.
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the amount in question is material,28 disclosing the liability on the
financial statements.29 This procedure is required by the standards of
the accounting profession3 ° and for some of the filings mandated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.31
The corporate client's liability for income tax is one such contin-
gency.32 Because the IRS has not settled the appropriate tax treatment
of many transactions, it may challenge the client's characterization of a
given transaction.33  The corporation's income tax liability may in-
crease if the IRS interpretation is accepted. IRS review of the tax re-
turns of large corporations is a virtual certainty34 and results in a lag of
several years between filing and eventual settlement. 35 During this in-
terim period the corporation is potentially liable for the additional tax
assessment that would result from a successful IRS challenge.36
To assess the adequacy of a corporation's accrual, the auditors and
corporate management engage in a worst-case analysis 37 of the tax
28. "The materiality of an item may depend on its size, its nature, or a combination of both.
An item should be regarded as material if there is reason to believe that knowledge of it would
influence the decisions of an informed investor." PRINCIPLES oF AunrriNo, supra note 21, at 28.
Accord, Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(n) (1981).
29. FASB No. 5, supra note 26, §§ 9-10.
30. Id. The principle of conservatism in accounting "calls for due caution and a careful
assessment of risks and uncertainties. When a decision requires judgment, accountants tend to
select those procedures which result in smaller measures of resources or income." E. SPILLER,
supra note 20, at 24-25.
31. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02(25) (1981). The SEC requires the filing of financial
statements as part of: (1) registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A
(25)-(27), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976); (2) registration statements under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, §§ 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b)(1)(J)-(L), 781(g)() (1976); (3) proxy and in-
formation statements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976);
Schedule 14A, Item 15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1981); and (4) annual reports under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a)(2), 78o(d) (1976); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 249.310, 249.460 (1981).
32. PRINCIPLES OF AuDrriNO, supra note 21, at 605-06.
33. Id.
34. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 949 (D. Colo. 1975) (IRS had
audited every corporate tax return since 1913), a4t'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (four IRS agents on full time assignment); Kurtz
& Panel, Discussion on "Questionable Positions," 32 TAx LAw. 13, 15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Kurtz].
35. Kurtz, supra note 34.
36. PRINCIPLES OF Aunrrnio, supra note 21, at 605-06.
37. AICPA AuDrr STANDARDs, supra note 21, § 337.05. This analysis is an attempt to un-
cover "what the worst possible nightmare is the client can conceive can happen if every assump-
tion on which he based his tax were to go against him in some kind of litigation.
"He may think up contingencies even more lurid than the worst contingencies a revenue agent
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/7
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treatment of selected items on the corporation's return. A worst-case
tax assessment is then computed and a portion of this amount is ac-
crued or reserved.3 8 This process takes place separately from the prep-
aration of the actual tax return, regardless of whether the corporation
also has engaged the auditing firm to prepare the corporation's tax re-
turn. 39 The transactions that are the basis of this process are available
to the IRS separately in the form of the corporate accounting records.
4 °
The product, which is the property of the auditor,41 is known as the tax
accrual workpapers.41 Access to these workpapers is the source of con-
troversy among the IRS, the auditors, and their corporate clients.43
The interests at stake are substantial. Access to the workpapers
would provide the IRS with a "roadmap" to those "soft spots" in the
return where additional probing might prove profitable. 44 The IRS
maintains that such information is necessary in a taxation system based
on self assessment. The large corporate taxpayer may knowingly bury
questionable positions among thousands of transactions, gambling
against the possibility of discovery upon an IRS audit.45 For the tax-
comes up with .. " United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975)
(testimony of M. Stone, past president, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants), a td,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). See also Caplin, IRS Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual
Workpapers, supra note 6; Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax
Accrual WorkpapersZ supra note 6; Note, supra note 4.
38. FASB No. 5, supra note 26, § 8. See Brief for Appellant-Respondent at 4-5, United
States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), al'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
39. Brief for Appellant-Respondent at 4,35-37, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474
F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), a f'd, 623 F.2d 725 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
Taxpayers use this separation of procedures to bolster the argument that the workpapers are not
relevant within the meaning of the summons authority of § 7602. See note 139 infra and accom-
panying text. In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942,952 (D. Colo. 1975), aft'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), the court found the argument persuasive. In United States v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 329 (D. Mass. 1979), af'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), the court rejected this approach.
40. Brief for Appellant-Respondent at 5, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F.
Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), a'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
41. AICPA AuDrr STANDARDs, supra note 21, § 338.06. See PRINCIPLES OF AUDrrING,
supra note 21, at 287; Caplin, IRS Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6,
at 39, coL 1.
42. Caplin, IRS Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6, at 39, coL 2.
The workpapers are also referred to as the tax pool analysis, tax liability contingency analysis, tax
cushion, or tax contingency reserve. Id.
43. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
44. Caplin, IRS Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6, at 39, coL 3.
45. Kurtz, supra note 34, at 16.
We now have situations in which the taxpayer well knows which items he would like
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payer, release of this information means that he acquires the burden of
administrative proceedings, litigation, and possible additional tax lia-
bility. The taxpayer contends that it is inequitable for the IRS to re-
quire him, in effect, to furnish the IRS with the case against him.4 6 The
auditor is concerned that release of the desired information will
threaten the confidential relationship with the client that facilitates the
free flow of information.47 If the client knows that the IRS can gain
access to any information in his auditor's hands, he will not communi-
cate much useful and important information. The end result is less
accurate reporting of the corporate taxpayer's financial position and
consequent injury to the public which relies on that information.48
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Statutory Requirement of Relevance
The statutory authority for the IRS's summons power is contained in
section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code.4 9 The summons is not self-
executing."0 Upon challenge, the IRS must seek enforcement51 in an
the agent not to find. He may have sought legal opinions about them and may have, in
fact, reserved against them on his balance sheet. Yet disclosure of those reserves has
been resisted by taxpayers and by their professional advisors.. . . It is difficult to im-
prove relations between agents and taxpayers when taxpayers have the information and,
in effect, say to the agent, here is the haystack, the needle is in there somewhere, and it's
your problem to find it.
Id.
46. Brief for Appellant-Respondent at 10, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F.
Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), aas'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
47. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), a'd, 550 F.2d
615 (10th Cir. 1977). The court quoted from the expert opinion testimony of a certified public
accountant:
If we were hampered in any audit situation by the fact that the client knows that if he
gives us any data. . . it's going to be readily available to the Government, I cannot
imagine how we would be able to render audit opinions for that client for very long. It
would just absolutely cut offour communication, and ifI were the client, I would be the
first to admit that that is the way I would feeL
Id. at 954.
48. United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 326-27 (D. Mass. 1979), af 'd,
623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand,
413 F. Supp. 942, 958 (D. Colo. 1975), at'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). See notes 20-31 supra
and accompanying text.
49. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text
50. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1964).
51. LR.C. § 7402(b) provides:
(b) To Enforce Summons-If any person is summoned under the internal revenue
laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of
the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/7
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adversarial proceeding in the federal courts. 2 The proceeding affords
the taxpayer complete protection53 and the taxpayer may also appeal
the decision. 4
The Supreme Court enunciated a four-part standard for judicial en-
forcement of an IRS summons in United States v. Powell.55 The IRS
must show: (1) that a legitimate purpose exists for conducting the in-
vestigation,56 (2) that the inquiry is relevant to that purpose,57 (3) that
the Commissioner does not already possess the information sought,58
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production
of books, papers, or other data.
52. I.R.C. § 7604(b) provides:
(b) Enforcement-Whenever any person summoned under section 6420(e)(2),
6421(0(2), 6424(d)(2), 6427(h)(2), or 7602 neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or
to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to give testimony, as required, the
Secretary may apply to the judge of the district court or to a United States commissioner
for the district within which the person so summoned resides or is to be found for an
attachment against him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commis-
sioner to hear the application, and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an attachment
directed to some proper officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought
before him to proceed to a hearing of the case; and upon such hearing the judge or
United States commissioner shall have power to make such order as he shall deem
proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts, to enforce obedi-
ence to the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his default or
disobedience.
In Reisman ;: Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 448 (1964), the Court stated that "[§ 7604(b)] was intended
only to cover persons who were summoned and wholly made default or contumaciously refused to
comply."
53. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964).
54. Id. at 449.
55. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In Powell, the IRS summoned the president of the corporate tax-
payer. Thus the decision arguably was addressed to a third party summons and the lower courts
have indeed applied the Powell criteria to third party summons. See, e.g., United States v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Colo. 1975), aft'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
Seegenerall 7 ARIZ. L. REV. 143 (1965); 63 MICH. L. REv. 939 (1965); 38 TEMP. L.Q. 462 (1965).
56. The IRS may not use summons power to gather information for an exclusively criminal
investigation. The investigation is solely for a criminal purpose when the case is referred to the
Department of Justice, and the IRS has institutionally abandoned the pursuit of a civil tax deter-
mination or collection. United States v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978) (IRS special
agent summoned bank files relating to taxpayer). See also Stroud, The Criminal Prosecution De-
fense: .4 Defense to a § 7602 Summons, 4 Am. J. CRIM. LAW 152 (1976); Comment, The Improper
Purpose Challenge to a § 7602 Summons, 31 TAx LAw. 226 (1977).
57. See notes 76-108 infra and accompanying text.
58. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument in United States v. Coopers & Lybrand that
because the IRS had seen the records which served as the basis for the workpapers, it had, in
effect, also seen the workpapers. 413 F. Supp. at 949. See United States v. Pritchard, 438 F.2d 969
(5th Cir. 1971).
One commentator suggests that this requirement is intended to protect the taxpayer against
harassment by the IRS. Note, supra note 4, at 367 & n. 111.
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and (4) that the IRS has followed the administrative steps required by
the Code. 9
The Internal Revenue Manual sets out guidelines for issuance of the
summons.6" In 1980 the revised manual directly addressed tax contin-
gency workpapers for the first time.6" Officers of the Service have indi-
cated their intent to vigorously pursue access to the workpapers.62 The
1981 manual revisions, however, tighten the summons issuance proce-
dure63 and significantly restrict the circumstances in which the IRS
may seek workpapers.64 The courts, on the other hand, have held that
failure to follow these guidelines does not run afoul of the fourth part
of the Powell standard.65 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Caceres,66 refused to order exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the manual's procedures because the violation implicated
no constitutional or statutory rights. The manual thus may indicate the
Service's policy,67 but it provides scant protection for the taxpayer. 68
The Code provides additional requirements for the issuance of sum-
monses to third-party record keepers.69 The IRS must notify the tax-
59. See notes 60-68 infra and accompanying text.
60. I INmTNAL R.vNizu MANuAL (Audit) (CCH) §§ 4020-4026 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
mM].
61. IRM, supra note 60, § 4024.3. See Diss & Hanson, Tax Contingency Audit Workpapers.:
Current Developments, Observations, andProposals, 12 TAX ADWVSOR 104, 105 (1981); Caplin, IRS
Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6, at 39, cols. 1-3. "Obviously, the
IRS has rejected a policy of forbearance and restraint in using its summons authority." Id.
62. Caplin, IRS Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6, at 39, col. 1.
63. IRM, supra note 60, § 4024. The agent must seek written approval of the Examination
Section Chief before seeking a summons for the workpapers. Id.
64. Id. The agent must have substantially completed the examination, exhausted other
sources of information, and identified specific issues. See IRS Revises Agents Manual to Limit
Probes of Workpapers, J. ACCOuNTANCY, July 1981, at 10.
65. United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United
States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 331 (D. Mass. 1979), a 'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
66. 440 U.S. 741 (1979). See Parnell, The Internal Revenue Manual Its Utility and Legal
Effect, 32 TAX LAW. 687 (1979); Postscript-The Internal Revenue Manual: Its Uttl) and Legal
Effect, 33 TAX LAW. 341 (1979).
67. See Caplin, IRS Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6, at 39,
cols. 1-3.
68. Auditing firms report that fear of the IRS summons of workpapers has made corporate
clients reluctant to discuss sensitive tax issues with the auditors. IRS to Clarfy Rules Limiting
Agents Probe of Tax Workpapers, . AccouNmTCY, May 1981, at 8.
69. I.R.C. § 7609. Before this amendment to the Code, inteivention by the taxpayer in a
third party summons proceeding was within the discretion of the judge as measured by the magni-
[Vol. 60:185
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payer whose records are sought.7 ° The taxpayer may then instruct the
third party not to comply and may also intervene in the proceeding.7'
The courts have held that a higher level of scrutiny is necessary when
third-party summonses are challenged.12
The Supreme Court has held that the person summoned may chal-
lenge the summons on any appropriate ground.73  Taxpayers fre-
quently challenge the relevance of the records sought by the IRS74 and
may also contend that the summoned material is protected by a testi-
monial privilege.75
B. Case Law Interpretation of Relevance
The requirement of relevance in section 7602 invites the divergent
views of its meaning that have emerged in litigation. Lacking guidance
from the legislative history,76 courts have turned to the language of the
statute,77 analogies to other instances of compulsory process, 78 and the
policy of the tax system79 to support their various articulations of the
tude of the interest sought to be protected. See Note, Challenging the Tax Summons: Procedures
and Defenses, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (1978).
70. I.R.C. § 7609(a).
71. I.R.C. § 7609(b).
72. United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 488 F.2d 953, 960 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 943, aft'd, 518 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1975); Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207,
211-12 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968).
73. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
74. See notes 76-108 infra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 109-21 infra and accompanying text.
76. The summons authority in the original legislation creating the income tax system ex-
tended to "any objects liable to tax or the returns thereof." Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § I, 38 Stat.
114, 178-79.
In 1918 Congress changed the language to read: "[T]o examine any books, papers, records or
memoranda bearing upon the matters required to be included in the return. ... Act of Feb. 24,
1919, Ch. 18, § 1305, 40 Stat. 1057, 1142. The committee report stated that "[t]he remainder of the
general provisions carry forward into this bill the general administrative provisions of the revenue
acts of 1916 and 1917, which are repealed by this bill." H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 58
(1918).
Congress enacted the present language in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The final com-
mittee report states: '§ 7602 Examination of books and witnesses. This section contains no mate-
rial change from existing law." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A436 (1954), reprinted in
11954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4025, 4584.
Congress has not indicated the original intent as to the scope of the summons power, nor has
Congress ever changed it.
77. See notes 144-46 infra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 86-89 infra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 199-205 infra and accompanying text.
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concept. The results, which form a spectrum between a requirement of
probable cause s° and a license for a fishing expedition,8 are confusing
and difficult to apply.82
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Powell83 is a promising
starting point, relevance was not an issue in that case. 84 Litigants have
argued the Powell relevancy requirement, and courts have ruled on that
basis,85 but the content of the various relevancy standards has not come
from courts' application of Powell.
The Powell Court compared the IRS summons power to the inquisi-
torial power of the grand jury.86 Some courts subsequently have used
this characterization of the IRS summons power to support an expan-
sive concept of relevance.87 Litigants may challenge the compulsory
process of both the grand jury and administrative agencies on the basis
of overbreadth. 8' This prohibition requires only that the summons is
80. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (probable cause not required).
81. United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967) (summons
does not authorize fishing expedition). Contra, United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970). In Giordano, the court said that "It]axpayer in his
brief characterized the government's efforts as a 'fishing expedition.' If so, the Secretary or his
delegate has been specifically licensed to fish by § 7602."
82. See, eg., United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968) (the question of
relevance is not easily resolved).
83. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
84. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Colo. 1975), afl'd, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
85. See, eg., United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 329-30 (D. Mass.
1979), at'd, 623 F.2d 725 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
86. 379 U.S. at 57.
"[The grand jury] does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assur-
ance that it is noL" United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642.43 (1950).
87. See, ag., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.
1968).
88. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-53 (1950); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 76-77 (1906).
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures arguably ap-
plies to an administrative summons. The amendment protects against an overly broad grand jury
subpoena duces tecum. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 10-12 (1973). In Powell, the Court
compared the § 7602 summons power to the inquisitorial power of the grand jury. United States
v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964). The inference that fourth amendment proiections apply as well
to a § 7602 summons is thus logical.
The fourth amendment, however, affords limited additional protection. The compulsion to ap-
pear is not a fourth amendment seizure. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973). If the
production of records is a search, i. at 11-12, the summoned taxpayer or accountant can assert
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"reasonable" and that the requested materials are relevant.8 9 The
courts' analogical reasoning thus leads back to a relevance standard
without meaningful content.
The courts have proffered varying formulations of a standard of rele-
vance. One of the most frequently cited tests is whether the summoned
materials "might have thrown light upon" the correctness of the tax-
payer's return.' ° United States v. Harrington further refined "might" to
require a "realistic expectation rather than an idle hope."'" The mean-
ing of this standard in a given instance, however, is dependent on the
facts of the case. Most of the courts construing relevance have dealt
with records of the actual transactions that formed the basis of the in-
come tax liability.9' The few cases in which the IRS has sought back-
ground materials that were either conjectural or only tangentially
possible defenses related to privacy and overbreadth. A protectable privacy interest, however, is
dependent upon a showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967). That is a difficult burden to sustain with respect to the records that form the
factual basis of the tax return. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906).
Cases that involve a corporation include an additional factor. Corporations are creatures of the
state, recipients of certain privileges as enumerated in the state-granted charter because of a per-
ceived public interest in the existence of this form of business organization. The state, and by
extension the federal government, may thus inquire into the corporate records to flush out abuses
of the privilege of doing business. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
A corporation is not similarly disqualified from asserting the unenforceability of the summons
on the basis of overbreadth. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950);
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906). See Note, supra note 9, at 366. A challenge on these grounds is resolved by ascertaining
the reasonableness of the summons, a standard similar to relevance and thus of little additional
assistance. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950).
89. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950).
90. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1960).
91. 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968).
92. In United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975), the Court enforced a John Doe sum-
mons issued to a bank in order to discover the identity of a person making deposits of large
numbers of deteriorated $100 bills. The Court found that the deposits suggested the possibility of
liability for unpaid taxes and that the IRS had a legitimate interest in large or unusual financial
transactions. Id. at 149. The following summonses of similar type have been enforced: summons
for bank records of customers' deposits and cancelled checks, United States v. Continental Bank
& Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974); summons to tax preparer for records of clients' names
and social security numbers, United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973); IRS summons
for alimony payment records held by an attorney in connection with an investigation of the cli-
ent's former spouse, United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968); summons for a
London bank's records that provided the only opportunity for the Government to determine the
validity of a taxpayer's claimed earned income, Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1960).
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related to records of actual transactions have produced widely diver-
gent results.93
In United States v. Matras94 the court considered whether proposed
company-wide budgets summoned by the IRS were relevant to the tax
investigation of the Northern Natural Gas Company. The company
had already provided all records of actual, taxable transactions. The
investigation was closed, subject to the outcome of the request for the
budgets.95 The IRS claimed that the documents would provide a
"roadmap" for the investigation.96 The court agreed with the corpora-
tion's contention that only actual transactions, not proposed budgets,
were relevant to a tax investigation. The court acknowledged both the
inquisitorial power of the IRS97 and the Harrington court's relevancy
standard.98 It concluded, however, that convenience for the govern-
ment in the form of its need for a "roadmap" did not satisfy the rele-
vancy requirement, and it therefore denied production.99
In United States v. Noall" the IRS sought internal audit reports pre-
pared by the Bunge Corporation. The audit reports resulted from
Bunge monitoring its adherence to established accounting and financial
procedures within its operating divisions. 10 1 The contents included
"hearsay, rumors, opinions and other evidence" pertaining to book-
keeping practices. 1 2 Bunge resisted the summons, claiming the records
were neither used for, nor prepared in connection with, the company's
income tax returns. 03 The court ordered production, relying on the
"might have thrown light upon' 4 articulation of relevance, and stated
that the standard was particularly low when the taxpayer's papers were
93. See, ag., United States v. Smith, 373 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Miss. 1974) (summons limited to
those records held by accountant that actually were used in preparation of the client's tax return);
United States v. Williams, 337 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (denied summons seeking answer-
ing service records of psychologist suspected of understating income receipts), appeal vacated and
dismissed, 486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(summons for minutes of board of directors meeting enforced).
94. 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 1273-74 n.2.
96. Id. at 1273.
97. Id. at 1274. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
98. 487 F.2d at 1274. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
99. 487 F.2d at 1275.
100. 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), ceri. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
101. Id. at 125.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
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at issue and no third parties were involved.' It found no significance
in Bunge's contention that the records were not prepared for income
tax purposes. If the records revealed overstatements or understate-
ments of income or expense or identified accounting practices leading
to such errors, then they were clearly relevant.1" The court flatly re-
jected Bunge's public policy argument that production would hamper
full and frank disclosure in internal audits. The court stated that the
language of section 7602 was the congressional response to such con-
cerns and that the courts should not act in contradiction. 0 7 Finally, the
court rejected the taxpayer's request for an in camera inspection of the
requested documents to ascertain relevancy. The court concluded that
Congress could not have intended to impose such a burdensome task
on the courts.108
C. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Rule
The testimonial privileges act to exclude relevant evidence because
of a superior public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
affected relationship. 09 The attorney-client privilege is one of the old-
est privileges recognized at common law. When a client seeks legal
advice from an attorney, the confidential communications of the client
relating to that purpose are, at the client's insistence, permanently pro-
tected from disclosure by himself or the attorney unless the protection
105. 587 F.2d at 126.
106. Id.
The court in United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), engaged in similar
reasoning. In,4cker, the IRS sought minutes from meetings of the board of directors and execu-
tive committee. The court noted the analogy between the functions of the IRS agent and the
auditor:
The accountants, to be sure they see what is germane to their task, look at minutes that
turn out not to be germane. They do not accept the views of others as to what they ought
to examine, and the company does not expect them to do so. This makes sense for them.
It makes equally good sense, mwatdr mmtandi, for the agents of the IRS.
Id. at 861-62 (footnotes omitted).
107. 587 F.2d at 126.
108. Id. at 127.
In United States v. First Chicago Corp., [1979-I] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 86,034 (N.D. fI 1978),
the IRS sought internal audit reports prepared by the corporation. The corporation submitted 23
of the reports of a relevancy determination in camera. The eight relevant reports were records of
actual transactions with tax consequences. The other 15, which failed to satisfy the relevance stan-
dard, contained discussions of internal operating procedures, reports of spot checks on various
departments, and references to "de minimis" transactions. Id.
109. 8 J. WiMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961). See general, Lipton,
Privileged Communications, 13 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAx. 955, 961 (1955).
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is waived.11° The privilege extends to corporate clients as well as indi-
viduals."' The courts generally have accepted its applicability to IRS
summons enforcement proceedings." 2
Federal law does not recognize an accountant-client privilege.11 3
Under the federal rule, communications to an accountant fall within
the attorney-client privilege to the extent that the accountant's work is
in aid of the attorney's legal services.114 The privilege, however, does
not protect communications to the accountant prior to the establish-
110. 8 J. WIGMORF, supra note 109, § 2292.
111. Until recently, the courts used two competing formulations and one modification of the
scope of the attomey-client privilege in the corporate setting. The "subject matter" test, formu-
lated in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affdby an equally
divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), sustains the privilege for the corporation when the employee's
communication is made "at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject
matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the com-
munication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment." Id. at 491-92.
The "control group" test holds the privilege applicable only when the corporate employee who
communicates with the attorney has the power to act on the basis of the advice given. City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485-86 (E.D. Pa.),petitlonfor manda-
mus andprohibition deniedsub no, General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The "subject matter" test was modified in Diversified Indus. Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), such that a claim to the privilege would be
sustained when the communication directed by the corporate superior was made for the purpose
of securing legal advice and was not disseminated beyond those persons with a need to know its
content.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has signaled the probable demise of the "control group" test.
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Court held that the attorney-client privi-
lege protected from an IRS summons questionnaires circulated by Upjohn's attorney in the course
of an internal investigation of illegal foreign payments. Although the Court refused to endorse a
single test, opting instead for resolution on a "case-by-case" basis, it maintained that "the narrow
'control group test'... cannot ... govern the development of the law in this area." Id. at 686,
The Court stressed that the control group test "overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect
not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of informa-
tion to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice." .d. at 683. See generally 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 1041 (1980).
112. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Note, Privileged Communications
Before FederalAdrmnistrative,4gencies: The LawApplied in the District Courts, 31 U. Cm. L. REV.
395, 397, 398 n.7 (1964), and cases cited therein. But see United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp.
925, 928 (E.D. Ky. 1962) (application of privilege "must be kept in the narrow confines of its own
reason for being"). See generally Orkin, Attorney-Clent Privileges in Tax Matters, 49 A.B.A.J. 794
(1963).
113. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1972). Some states have enacted statutory
accountant-client privileges. See generally Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants andAc-
counting-A Critical Analysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, 66 MICH. L. Rnv. 1246
(1968).
114. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). "Accounting concepts are a foreign
language to some lawyers in almost all cases and to almost all lawyers in some cases. Hence, the
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ment of the attorney-client relationship.' 15
Although it is not, strictly speaking, a privilege, the closely allied at-
torney's work product rule may also provide protection from an IRS
summons. 1 6 The work product rule shields materials prepared by an
attorney in anticipation of litigation."17 It supports the public policy
interest in the efficient adjudication of claims." 8 A showing of particu-
larized need may overcome the rule, but the attorney's legal theories
and thought processes are still held inviolate." 9 The work product rule
extends to materials prepared by agents of the attorney or other repre-
sentatives of the party.' It does not, however, protect materials pre-
pared for business purposes or public requirements unrelated to
litigation.' 2 1
presence of an accountant... ought not destroy the privilege .... " Id. at 922. See generally
Garbis, Discovery and Defenses in Tax Fraud Investigations, 10 CuM. L. Rav. 655, 662 (1980).
In tax practice, the roles of the attorney and the accountant are, at times, indistinguishable.
Some commentators have argued that this functional overlap is not a sufficient reason to extend
the privilege to accountants. See Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Profes-
sionals: Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrines, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1246-49
(1962). Other commentators have urged that the public policy interest, which is furthered by
recognition of the attorney-client privilege in tax matters, does not suffer because an accountant,
rather than an attorney, is rendering the service. Katsoris, Confidential Communications-The.Ac-
countant's Dilemma, 35 FoRDHAm L. REv. 51, 67-68 (1966). Wigmore has argued for extension of
the privilege to specialists practicing before administrative agencies. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
109, § 2300a, at 581-82. See also Comment, Accountants, Privileged Communications and Section
7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 252 (1965).
For a general discussion of accountants and tax practice, see Gray, Lawyers andAccountants in
Tax Practice-A Challenge to the Bar, 15 J. TAX. 100 (1961).
115. See Garbis, supra note 114, at 662.
116. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981); United States v. Brown, 478
F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1973).
117. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947).
118. Id. at 510.
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The rule provides:
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial
by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attor-
ney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in preparation of his case and
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation.
120. Id.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970).
In the wake of the Upjohn decision, see note 111 supra and accompanying text, commentators
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III. THE CASES
In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand'22 the IRS, pursuant to its
investigation of the Johns-Manville Corporation, issued a summons to
the public accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand for production of the
tax accrual work papers pertaining to the firm's audit of Johns-
Manville. 23 The taxpayer intervened'2 4 and objected, inter alia, on the
grounds of relevance as contained in the Powell criteria 25 and in the
statute. 126
The District Court for Colorado acknowledged the elusiveness of the
concept of relevance and the lack of judicial standards for its determi-
nation.127 It set up two categories of potentially relevant documents.
The first category included documents, such as records of actual taxa-
ble transactions, that were ordinarily relevant and reachable whether
sought from the taxpayer or a third party.12 8 The second category en-
compassed all data not falling within the first category, including docu-
ments not prepared for nor used in connection with the determination
of tax liability 29 and documents that contained the private thoughts of
the taxpayer. 130 The court concluded that the IRS must satisfy a higher
standard of relevance to obtain disclosure of materials, such as the
workpapers, in this second category.' 31 The government's testimony
that the documents "might shed some light' 32 on unidentified, addi-
tional tax liabilities was not sufficient to sustain its burden of establish-
have speculated on the reach of the "in anticipation of litigation" requirement. "In one sense at
least, preparation for tax litigation commences with the structuring of the transaction, its docu-
mentation, perhaps even the way in which the tax return ... is prepared." Nat'l L.L, Feb. 9,
1981, at 3, col. 4. The contrary view is:
Using the attorney in this audit role will not cloak the detail underlying the total tax
provision figure with some form of privilege. The work involved is not being done for
the purpose of providing legal advice to the client nor in preparation for litigation, but
rather as support for financial statements intended to go to third parties.
Id., Mar. 2, 1981, at 3, coL 6.
122. 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aftd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
123. Id. at 944.
124. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 1 & 76-77 supra.
127. 413 F. Supp. at 950.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 952.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 951.
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ing relevance.' 33 The court consequently refused to order production
of the workpapers."'
The court also considered the taxpayer's public policy arguments. It
quoted extensively from expert witness testimony that disclosure to the
IRS of the conjectural workpapers would cut off the frank communica-
tions between accountant and client that are necessary to assure ade-
quate reporting of financial position.'35 The additional time and
expense burdens of producing the workpapers were also a significant
factor in the court's decision.' 36 Although these public policy concerns
alone were not sufficient to justify nondisclosure of the requested docu-
ments, they did carry considerable weight in the balancing process that
the court implicitly adopted to measure relevance. 37
In United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 138 the District Court for
Massachusetts, under a substantially similar fact situation, 39 ordered
production of the workpapers. The respondents relied on the Coopers
133. Id. at 954.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 953-54. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
136. 413 F. Supp. at 954.
137. Id.
138. 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), afld, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021
(1980).
After the court denied a motion for a stay of the district court's enforcement order, Arthur
Andersen & Co. turned over the summoned documents and appealed that part of the order requir-
ing production of the tax liability contingency analysis. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal as
moot, holding that the firm could have refused production and risked contempt to preserve the
appeal. 623 F.2d 720, 722 (1980). A second appeal on the issue of whether bankruptcy proceed-
ings foreclosed the IRS's investigatory authority resulted in the affirmance of the district court's
determination that it did not. 623 F.2d 725 (1980). The mootness issue was the basis of the peti-
tion for certiorari.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., [1980-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9655 (S.D.N.Y.) was
another workpapers case decided shortly after Arthur Andersen. The court, relying on the Arthur
Andersen decision and United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
923 (1979), see notes 100-08 supra and accompanying text, ordered production of the workpapers.
United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. IlL. 1981), is the most recent
case addressing the workpapers issue. The auditors in Price Waterhouse refused to turn over only
that portion of the workpapers containing opinions "on issues not specifically identified by the
IRS." Id. at 998. The court concluded that the auditor's objection did not involve the judgmental
nature of the workpapers. The issue was whether the IRS's failure to identify the specific issues
addressed in the portion of the workpapers withheld rendered those portions irrelevant. The court
concluded that it did not and ordered enforcement. The court acknowledged the importance of
the policy arguments asserted by the auditors but found it unnecessary to address them in decid-
ing the narrow issue before it.
139. In Coopers & Lybrand the auditing firm was not responsible for preparation of the firm's
income tax returns. In ArthurAndersen it was. The Arthur Andersen court did not distinguish the
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& Lybrand court's interpretation of relevancy, but the court refused to
adopt that standard 40 and turned instead to the statutory language for
guidance.' 4 ' It found no support in the statute for restricting relevant
information to information that formed the basis of the tax return. 142
The relevancy standard also reached material that involved characteri-
zation of the transactions that were the basis of the income tax liabil-
ity.-143 The statutory use of the words "any"" and "may be relevant or
material"' 4 1 was evidence to the court of this expansive scope.
146
The court maintained that "the collective familiarity" 47 of the inves-
tigating agents was sufficient to satisfy the government's burden of es-
tablishing relevance.' The IRS could not and was not required to
guarantee relevancy prior to production. It could make that determi-
nation only after the summoned documents were produced and
analyzed. 149
The ArthurAndersen court relied on precedent to reject the account-
ant-client privilege urged by the corporation, 50 but did, however, ac-
cases on this basis, but the factor was stressed in Noah v. United States, 587 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
140. 474 F. Supp. at 329.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 329-30.
143. Id. at 330.
144. See note 1 supra.
145. Id.
146. 474 F. Supp. at 329.
The court in United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979), suggested that Congress used "may" advisedly and in recognition of the fact that because
the IRS could not determine relevancy in fact prior to inspection of the documents, the threshold
standard of relevance was low. Id. at 125-26. In its brief, Arthur Andersen & Co. suggested that
"may" was merely indicative of congressional recognition of the broader, but not limitless, scope
of inquiry in an investigatory context. Brief of Appellant-Respondent at 40, United States v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). See United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., [1980-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9655 (S.D.N.Y.), the
parties argued the meaning of the word "data" in the statute, see note I supra. The court rejected
the taxpayer's contention that the term "data" was restricted to records of actual transactions. See
Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers, supra
note 6, at 199.
147. 474 F. Supp. at 329. The term apparently refers to the agents' investigation of the affairs
of the taxpayer for a considerable period of time.
148. Id. at 329-30.
149. Id. at 330. One commentator has referred to this holding as a "catch 22." Caplin, IRS
Maintains Tough Stance on Accrual Workpapers, supra note 6, at 38, col. 3.
150. 474 F. Supp. at 326-27.
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knowledge the significance of the public policy concerns underlying the
privilege."5 Neither Arthur Andersen & Co. nor Coopers & Lybrand
asserted an attorney-client privilege or the work product rule.15 2 The
workpapers were neither the product of an attorney's work nor the re-
sult of confidential communications to an attorney.15 3
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Coopers & Lybrand and Arthur Andersen courts tested
the same concept against the same standard, their respective resolutions
of the question are at opposite poles. This exceedingly malleable stan-
dard offers little guidance or predictability. Relevancy is inherently a
balancing concept"' such that the courts must weigh the variables in
each case on an ad hoc basis.'55 When the IRS summons workpapers,
the relevant variables include (1) the nature of the information
sought, 56 (2) the party from whom it is sought, 57 (3) the public inter-
est in preserving confidentiality in that particular relationship,5 8 and
(4) the IRS's need for that particular information to perform its statu-
151. Id.
152. See notes 109-21 supra and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'd, 623
F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F.
Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), a'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). See also notes 183-98 infra and
accompanying text.
154. Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 19-25, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474
F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). See
C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77, at 159-60 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
Reconciling interests in privacy and confidentiality with the needs of litigants is not read-
ily achieved in terms of broad categories; it calls for the finer touch of the specific solu-
tion. A tool already at hand, though perhaps largely unrecognized, consists of
recognizing standing on the part of the possessor of information to question the legiti-
macy of need for it in litigation, ie., to raise issues of relevancy in the broad sense....
A similar thread runs through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limitation of discov-
ery to matter "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Relevancy
itself, of course, contemplates a process of weighing, and inevitably the judge must be
accorded a substantial measure of discretion.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
155. United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973).
156. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Colo. 1975), a 'd, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977) ("the character of the material and documents summoned is the pivotal
element in our consideration").
157. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968) (judicial scrutiny of sum-
mons particularly appropriate when records summoned are those of a third party).
158. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 948 (D. Colo. 1975), aft'd, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977) (policy considerations are relevant in a judicial enforcement
proceeding).
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tory mandate to collect taxes. 159 Balancing these factors reveals the di-
vergent and competing interests that are affected by the decision. In
contrast, the application of phraseology and conclusory analysis to sup-
port a decision provides no indication of what factors prompted the
result or whether the evidence was weighed at all.
The Coopers & Lybrand court balanced these various interests to a
greater legree than did the Arthur Andersen court. 160 The Coopers &
Lybrand court considered the nature of the documents sought and a
certified public accountant's expert testimony both on the methods em-
ployed to compile the documents and the damage that would result
from their disclosure.'61 The government sought the workpapers to as-
sist it in identifying additional tax liabilities. 161 On further questioning,
however, the government admitted that the books and records already
in its possession were adequate to complete the investigation.1 63 In
contrast, the Arthur Andersen court summarily accepted an affidavit at-
testing to "the collective familiarity"'164 of the agents as a sufficient
showing of need for the summoned materials. 165
The Coopers & Lybrand court relied heavily on Matras,166 while the
Arthur Andersen court relied on Noall.167 The same contrast between
balancing the affected interests and a summary procedure is apparent
in those two earlier opinions. Although the Matras court weighed the
taxpayer's policy arguments, 168 the Noall court dismissed such consid-
erations.169 In Matras the government's testimony concerning its need
revealed nothing more than the desire for a roadmap as a convenience,
and the summons thus was denied. 7 In Noall the government demon-
159. United States v. Biscegla, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975) ("[i]t would be naive to ignore the
reality that some persons attempt to outwit the [tax] system and tax evaders are not readily
identifiable").
160. See notes 122-49 supra and accompanying text.
161. 413 F. Supp. at 953-54. See note 47 su.pra and accompanying text.
162. 413 F. Supp. at 951.
163. Id. at 952.
164. 474 F. Supp. at 329.
165. In United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968), the court rejected the notion
that it should order production of summoned records because "some chance of relevance exists
." Id. at 524. The court stated that "[t]he question... is whether from what the Govern-
ment already knows there exists the requisite nexus... ..." Id.
166. See notes 94-99 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 100-08 supra and accompanying text.
168. 487 F.2d at 1275.
169. See note 107 su.pra and accompanying text.
170. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
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strated its need by alleging that the documents were potentially rele-
vant and that a determination of actual relevancy was possible only
after inspection."' 1 The court rejected the taxpayer's request for an evi-
dentiary hearing. 72
The balancing approach adopted by the Coopers & Lybrand and Ma-
tras courts, however, still fails to provide judges and litigants with a
relevance standard that assures consistent results and a degree of cer-
tainty.173 The Coopers & Lybrand court suggested a logical first step in
the development of a more workable standard. It divided potentially
relevant documents into two categories: factual and nonfactual docu-
ments. 174 The first category includes actual records of taxable transac-
tions. These records are unquestionably relevant and, barring other
prohibitions, 175 are ordinarily subject to summons enforcement.' 76 The
second category includes the proposed budget in Matras,177 the internal
audit reports in Noall,178 and the workpapers in Coopers & Lybrand179
andArthurAndersen:80 documents that consist of plans, investigations,
speculations, and thought processes.1 8' This latter category is not avail-
able without a more specialized showing of need balanced against the
grounds for resistance.18 2
The attorney-client testimonial privilege 8 3 is not directly applicable
171. 587 F.2d at 125.
172. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
173. The Matras court recognized that without some limitation, all corporate documents are
relevant and thus discoverable. United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973). The
courts, however, are unable to agree upon the limits of relevancy. See, ag., United States v. First
Chicago Corp., [1979-1] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 186,034 (N.D. IML 1978) (summons of internal audit
reports).
174. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
175. Other prohibitions would include the Powell criteria, see notes 55-59 supra and accompa-
nying text, and the work product rule, see notes 116-21 supra and accompanying text.
176. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Colo. 1975), a f'd, 550
F2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
177. 487 F.2d at 1275.
178. 587 F.2d at 125-26.
179. 413 F. Supp. at 945.
180. 474 F. Supp. at 327 n.6.
181. In United States v. First Chicago Corp., [1979-1] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 86,034 (N.D. I1.
1978), the court rejected the claimed relevance of spot checks of individual departments "which
make passing references to individual, de mmImur transactions." Id. at 86,037.
182. A showing that the original records of account are unavailable may meet the specialized
showing of need. See Caplin, Should the Service be Perm'tted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual
Workpapers?, supra note 6, at 199. In In re Co-Build Co., [1977-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9735
(E.D. Pa.), the corporation's internal records were destroyed by fire.
183. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
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to a summons for workpapers because it is an accountant, rather than
an attorney, who has provided the service. 184 The attorney's work
product rule185 is not applicable because it is an accountant's, not an
attorney's, work product that is involved.186 The work is not done
strictly in preparation for trial because it is required independently of
anticipated litigation.'87 Nevertheless, the policy interests that underlie
these two privileges are applicable in the workpapers situation. 88
The Supreme Court recently addressed both the attorney-client priv-
ilege and the attorney's work product rule in Upjohn Co. v. United
States.189 The Court stressed that the attorney-client privilege protects
not only the giving of advice by the attorney but also his receipt of
information forming the basis of that advice. Free access to the latter is
critical to informed and effective counsel. 19 In the auditor-corporation
relationship, confidence similarly is necessary if the auditor is to fulfill
his duty to issue an informed opinion on the accuracy of the corporate
client's financial statements.' 9'
The Upjohn Court also strongly reaffirmed the attorney's work prod-
uct rule as enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor.'92 The rule, said the
Court, provides special protection for the mental processes and legal
theories "of an attorney or other representative."' 9 3 The interests of
both the clients and the judicial system require that an attorney have a
degree of privacy in the preparation of a case for trial.194
The analogy to the workpapers situation is strong. The workpapers
184. See notes 113-15 & 150-53 supra and accompanying text.
Recent commentary suggests that auditors, acting as agents of the corporation, submit the
workpapers to either corporate in-house counsel or outside counsel to obtain counsel's advice on
the fmancial statement provision for contingent income tax liability. This practice might bring the
workpapers within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Diss & Hanson, supra note 61,
at 106-07. Whether such communications are made for the purpose of obtaining business or legal
advice, however, is not clear. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
187. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
188. Compare notes 109-21 supra and accompanying text with notes 47-48 supra and accompa-
nying text.
189. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
190. Id. at 390.
191. See notes 48 & 135 supra and accompanying text.
192. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
193. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 n.7 (1981) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3)). See note 119 supra.
194. 449 U.S. at 397-98. Without the protection of the rule, "much of what's now put down in
writing would remain unwritten... Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevita-
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are a collection of possibly adverse legal theories compiled by the ac-
countant. 195 If they are available to the IRS for the asking, 196 the ac-
countant will perform the required work in his head, 197 and less
accurate reporting of financial position will result. 19s
The general objective of fair play in the tax system' 99 provides an
additional ground for resistance to the IRS summons of an account-
ant's workpapers. Preparation of the workpapers is necessary for com-
pliance with SEC regulations and with acceptable standards of practice
in the accounting profession.2°° The IRS does not require preparation
of such documents. Congress has not seriously considered suggestions
that taxpayers append to their tax returns a disclosure of questionable
positions.20' A corporation has a legal right to decrease its taxes by
means that it determines are in conformance with the law.20 2 Requir-
ing disclosure of the arguments the taxpayer conjures up against this
position is untenable. The self assessment system is buttressed by the
broad investigatory powers of the IRS, but it is also grounded in an
assumption of fair play by both sides.2 3 A requirement that the tax-
payer, in effect, prepare the IRS's case against his position is beyond
the bounds of fair play and is thus disruptive to the self assessment
system.2°4 The IRS has successfully rebuffed taxpayers who have
sought discovery of the IRS's legal position in litigation on the ground
that the information sought was neither factual nor relevant.205 The
bly develop in the giving of legal advice and the preparation of cases for trial." Id. at 398. (quot-
ing IHickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)).
195. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
196. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[d]iscovery
was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions on wits borrowed from
the adversary").
197. Brief for Appellant-Respondent at 6, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F.
Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
198. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
199. See Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual
Workpapers, supra note 6, at 200.
200. See notes 30-31 sufpra and accompanying text.
201. See Kurtz, supra note 34, at 13.
202. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). See ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
Erics, OPINsS, No. 314 (1967).
203. See note 199 sufpra and accompanying text.
204. Brief for Appellant-Respondent at 10, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F.
Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), ae'd, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
205. See, eg., P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 404, 414 (1974), in which the
court said that "[w]hat is relevant is thefacalinformation .... Mental impressions, legal analy-
sis, conclusions, and recommendations are generally not relevant."
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taxpayer should have the benefit of the same argument interpreted in
the same way.
V. CONCLUSION
The current uncertain status of the workpapers vis A vis the summons
authority of the IRS is unacceptable. The relevance requirement pro-
vides no inherent limits on the types of documents that the IRS may
summon. 20 6 The varying interpretations of the courts207 give corporate
taxpayers, accountants, and attorneys no basis for predicting outcomes
or protecting their interests. The attorney-client privilege is facially in-
applicable and judicial extension is unlikely.20 The attorney work
product doctrine serves as a useful analogy for the purposes of develop-
ing the policy considerations but can do little more.20 9 Whether ac-
complished statutorily or judicially, a workable, predictable standard is
necessary that will protect the workpapers from the summons absent an
extraordinary showing of need. The division of potentially relevant
documents according to their factual or nonfactual content is a logical
first step.210 Documents in the first category are ordinarily discovera-
ble.21' Discovery of documents in the second category should require a
showing of particularized need balanced against the policy interests in
nonproduction.2 '12 If the IRS meets this burden, the order to produce
should limit production to those portions of the documents containing
the facts for which the IRS has established need. The order should, if
possible, protect materials consisting of the mental processes and opin-
ions of the accountant. 21 3 This standard would help ensure access to
the information the IRS needs to carry out its mandate to collect the
206. See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 90-108 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 183-84 supra and accompanying text.
209. See notes 185-88 supra and accompanying text.
210. See notes 128-29 & 174-76 supra and accompanying text.
211. See notes 128 & 175-76 supra and accompanying text.
212. See notes 130 & 177-82 supra and accompanying text.
213. The Coopers & Lybrand court did not suggest that materials reflecting the accountant's
thought process were absolutely privileged. 413 F. Supp. at 950. The Supreme Court, in Upjohn
Co. v. United States, reserved judgment on the question of absolute privilege as applied to the
thought process revealed in the attorney's work product. 449 U.S. at 401. If the IRS shows both
necessity and unavailability from any other source, e.g., destruction of the transactions records,
see note 182 supra, the court may use an in camera inspection to excise material reflecting opin-
ions from the workpapers. The court in United States v. Noall rejected this possibility. 587 F.2d
at 127.
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taxes. In addition, this standard would serve the equally important
purposes of protecting the taxpayer's legitimate expectation in the con-
fidentiality of his and his accountant's thought processes and of pre-
serving the balance critical to the successful operation of the tax system.
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